We investigate which factors in ‡uence 44,649 employees' decision to invest in a top retail banking group in France. We have two objectives: (i) to explore factors associated with the amount invested in the plan, and (ii) to explore whether these factors have same associations with the probability of investing more than the incentive pay i.e. being an active investor. Speci…cally, we focus on four parameters that have been shown to a¤ect participation: liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs. We con…rm Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) assumptions according to which such factors contribute to explain non-participation. We show that ESPP contributors have very speci…c and unobserved motivations, as shown with the positive correlations between error terms in the two steps of investment decisions. The existence of unobservable investment motives can be explained by a lower risk aversion, a higher time preference, or a strong willingness to participate to corporate governance.
Introduction
Over the last decades, incentive pay arrangements have become a widespread phenomenon. In the United States, it has been estimated that 38.7 million employees are concerned by such schemes, representing approximately 20% of private sector employees (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010) . In France, the number of employee stock owners has increased from 700,000 in 1998 to 2.7 millions in 2007 (French Employee Ownership Association, 2009). This increased success has been driven by a permanent support from companies' executive managers and governments (Kruse, 2002) . For instance, incentive pay schemes that are usually bundled with ESPPs have a major in ‡uence on investment decisions. Usually, tax-free accruals of interest and tax-deductions are given for all contributions corresponding to an allocation of incentive pays.
Moreover, companies usually provide matching contributions when employees invest in ESPPs, which have been shown to increase employees' participation (Huberman et al, 2007) .
While there has been a large interest in company-based plans savings behaviors, few research articles were dedicated to the exploration of investment behaviors in ESPPs. Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) explain that in addition to risk aversion, four main factors can in ‡uence the decision to participate or not in ESPPs: liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs. Non-investors would have a lower income, a lower access to ESPPs-related information, a lower willingness to invest in company stocks, and would face higher behavioral biases such as procrastination and selfdefeating behavior. According to Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) , these four characteristics distinguish investors from non-investors. However, Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) do not test empirically these assumptions. To our knowledge, the in ‡uence of these factors on investors' behaviors in ESPPs has not been studied from an empirical perspective. Moreover, the relationship between incentive pay mechanisms and ESPPs remains unclear. Among investors, two main behaviors can be identi…ed. On the one hand, some employees choose to 2 invest an amount that is lower or equal to their incentive pay. For these employees, ESPPs investment may represent a way to increase their after tax income through deductions. On the other hand, some employees choose to invest more than their incentive pay, e.g. allocate to company stocks money that does not come from their job compensations. These latter employees make an arbitrage in favor of their company stocks within their overall wealth. Currently, there is no evidence that these factors will have the same associations with the decision to be an "active" investor, e.g. invest more than their incentive pay. For these "active" ESPPs investors, investment motivations may be di¤erent. Their willingness to become an employee owner or to save for the future may be very important in the decision process.
In this paper, we explore the association between ESPPs investment decisions and incentive pay mechanisms. Speci…cally, we study whether liquidity constraints, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs have same associations with the amount invested in ESPPs and the decision to become an "active" investor, conditional on participation. We identify characteristics associated with a higher probability of participating in ESPPs, and higher level of investment in ESPPs, conditional on participation. We distinguish "active" investors (who invest more than their incentive pay and/or up to the threshold) from other investors. We consider that investment decisions results from a two-step decision process : employees simultaneously decide to participate in the o¤er (or not) and how much to participate.
The determinants of ESPPs participation are relatively understudied, due to the lack of availability of appropriate data. Much of the literature has focused on relatively small datasets and/or US data. This paper uses an original a cross-sectional dataset describing investment decisions of 44,649 employees of a large French bank who were eligible to ESPPs investments in 2005.
We …nd that several proxies describing the presence of liquidity constraint, knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs are associated with differences in the probability of investment in ESPPs, and the conditional amounts invested. We also …nd the presence of a signi…cant association between the two steps of the investment decision process: investment choice (yes vs. no) and how much to invest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on employees'investment behaviors. Section 3 describes the methods used and section 4 reports the results obtained. Section 5 presents a discussion of our empirical results, and section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Our paper aims at investigating the factors associated with ESPPs participation. Speci…cally, we explore the association between the presence of liquidity constraint, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice and transaction costs with the decision to invest and the level of employee's investment decisions.
Liquidity constraint
Several factors can be used to control for the presence of liquidity constraints. Degeorge et al (2004) show that labour income and …nancial wealth are major determinants of participation in France Telecom's ESPPs. Liquidity constraints can be driven by labour income, which depends on human capital. Aubert and Rapp (2008, 2010) show that some human capital proxies such as education and seniority are associated with investment decisions in company-based savings plans. The current value of human capital is often modeled as a function of the current labor income, its rate of growth, and the temporal horizon during which it will be paid. According to Jappelli (1990) , the probability of facing liquidity constraints is a decreasing function of age, wealth and current income. Moreover, Jappelli and Pagano (1998) show that household credit and mortgage can be used as indicators of liquidity constraints. The nature of the job contract (permanent or temporary) may also a¤ect investment in ESPPs since unemployment threats may motivate investment decisions of risk averse employees who wish to cover themselves against future risks. Huberman et al. (2007) show that plan participation increases with compensation, and that 4 matching contributions have higher impact on poorest employees. This result can be explained by the fact that low-income employees are more likely to face liquidity constraints and are therefore more sensitive to matching contribution mechanisms. 
Imperfect knowledge of the plan

Asset choice
Another reason for non-participation discussed by Engelhardt and Madrian Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) …nally mention procrastination as a potential cause of non-participation in ESPPs. Procrastination is a particular type of self-control problem investigated by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) . In standard time value of money calculation, one dollar saved today would be perceived to be worth exponentially more in decades from now. On the contrary, procrastination means that individuals are hyperbolic discounters applying high discount rates to the near term and lower discount rates to the future (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004 ). In the French context, this e¤ect may be higher since participants' contribution to ESPPs must be frozen during a 5-year period. This restriction does not apply to American ESPPs participants who are allowed to sell out the shares the same day they buy them. Other transaction costs may be associated with investing in ESPPs. According to Degeorge et al (2004) , search costs deterred employees to invest in ESPPs o¤ered by France Telecom in 1997.
Transaction costs
This cognitive cost includes the time and e¤ort of analyzing and understanding the rules of ESPPs. The transaction costs may also result from switching money from an existing savings plan provided outside the company to the sponsor's plan. Gale and Scholz (1994) explain that this cost is less burdensome for richer employees. 
Motivations for exploring ESPPs investment behaviors
The di¢ culty with exploring investment behaviors in ESPPs has been described in previous research Rapp, 2008, 2010) . From a theoretical perspective, the challenge arises from the fact that ESPPs introduce a correlation between the risks associated with working and saving contracts. This correlation between human capital and portfolio risks is absent in most theoretical models of expected utility. Such models usually consider that risks associated to human capital and …nancial portfolio are independent. However, this assump-
tion cannot be applied in the case of ESPPs investment because employees are supposed to buy their company stocks.
Another explanation of potential divergence between theory and empirical evidence comes from the existence of bias in savers'economic rationality. Standard saving and consumption models describe investment behaviors using two parameters of preferences: risk aversion and time preference. According to the theory, savers prefer ‡exibility, i.e. the possibility to proceed to portfolio adjustments (Kreps, 1979) . The reliability of both parameters is debated by The eligibility was extended to all employees that had been hired at least two months before the o¤er occurred, and to retired employees. Eligible employees were able to invest up to 25% of their gross compensation to purchase their company stocks at a price equal to 85% of its fair market value. ESPPs investors become shareholders of the …rm they work for.
Incentive pay and sponsors' plans contributions were bundled, and framed by four main rules. Employees had to choose between getting the incentive pay in cash and have it included in their taxable income; or having the money put into the plan and excluded from their taxable income. Amounts invested in ESPPs were blocked for a 5-year period until 2010. Early-withdrawals were possible under speci…c conditions such as lay-o¤, divorce or bankruptcy. Company stocks could not be sold until 2010. The maximum amount each employee could contribute to the o¤er was e40,000. 
Sample characteristics
Model speci…cation
Our objectives are to explore whether liquidity constraints, imperfect plan information, asset choice, and transaction costs are associated with (i) amounts invested in ESPPs and (ii) the probability of being an "active" investor, conditional on participation. Because of non-randomness of participation choices, our analyses may face the presence of selection bias. As ESPPs investments introduce a correlation between employees' human and …nancial capital they are more risky than other …nancial investments. It can therefore be assumed that ESPPs contributors have a lower risk aversion than non-investors.
Determinants of amount invested, conditional on participation
Since we have data on participants and non-participants, we address potential selection bias problems using the Heckman's two-steps procedure (Heckman, 1979) . The …rst step of the model can be written as:
The I(:) function equals 1 if the employee i invests in the o¤er and is zero otherwise. We assume that the error terms in the selection equation, v, has zero-conditional mean and follows a standard normal distribution.
The second step of the model is given by:
We observe log(y i ) if p i = 1:The equation (2) can be written as:
where u is the standard error of the disturbance u, and (:) is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). The IMR is estimated as the prediction of the binomial probit
(1) in the …rst step and used as an explanatory variable in the second step. The second step uses an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) linear regression where the dependent variable is the logarithm of invested amounts.
The selection function has a set of explanatory factors z i that are a superset of 
Determinants of being an "active" investor, conditional on participation
To determine the probability of being an "active" investor, we use a binomial probit model with selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 1981). The formulation is written as:
where latent variable y 1 , which measures whether the employee invests more than his incentive pay, or up to the e40,000 participation limit, depends on factors x, and the binary outcome y 1 = 1 arises when y 1 > 0:
In this model, y 1i is observed only when the selection equation has a value of 1, e.g. when the employee participates in ESPPs:
The potential correlation between the error terms of the two equations is measured with the parameter . Rejecting the null hypothesis for indicates the presence of selection, e.g. a dependence across estimated equations. In the …rst step, we control for an identi…cation variable measuring the mean number of investors in the o¤er per department. This variable is associated with the probability of investment in the o¤er but it is not associated with the probability of being an "active" investor. Finally, the signi…cance of interaction terms in Probit models is measured using likelihood ratio (LR) tests.
Variables
Our independent variables of interest are factors describing the presence of liquidity constraint, knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs. The set of individual characteristics included in our models are therefore related to these four factors. Liquidity constraint is measured by gross income (continuous, in logarithm), incentive pay (continuous, in logarithm), and the presence of a permanent contract (vs. temporary contract). We create a proxy vari- 
Sensitivity analyses
Sensitivity analyses explore how endogeneity biases could in ‡uence our regression results, and focus on potential multicollinearity issues. Variables such as education, type of contract, salary, and incentive pay are likely to be simultaneously determined with investment. These variables are determined by unobservable factors such as ability or risk appetite, which are likely to be correlated with error terms in our regressions, raising problems of omitted variable biases.
To deal with such problems, we tried to identify a set of instrumental variables that were associated with endogenous variables but independent from the error term. However, we were not able to …nd satisfactory instruments. We there-fore decided to present for each model two di¤erent regressions using sets of variables that included: (ii) only the variables that are safely exogenous (age, Paris region, male, and interaction terms), and then (ii) the variables for which endogeneity can be suspected.
Many of the variables that are determined by ability are likely to be collinear. For instance, education, wage, and tenure could introduce multicollinearity. Potential problems of multicollinearity between independent variables are assessed using the Variance In ‡ation Factor (VIF by the presence of interacted variables. We ran additional regressions without these terms, which provided similar results for all variables (only the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with age changed), and concluded that multicollinearity issues do not a¤ect our results. To provide an idea of how severe the multicollinearity issue is, we provide a correlation matrix among all right-hand side variable. In additional sensitivity analyses (not reported in the paper but available upon request), we ran regressions that controlled for these variables one by one, in order to get additional information of how severe the multicollinearity issue is in our models. Finally, we ran the models without and with the inverse Mills ratio in order to be able to check the direction of the bias when selection is not controlled for, and we ran models where the age and tenure variables were broken into dummies, to further assess potential non-linear e¤ects with these variables (not reported in the paper but available upon request). Tables 4 and 5 provide results obtained after Heckman (columns (1) and (2)) and conditional OLS regressions (column (3)). Our variables measuring the presence of liquidity constraint (income, incentive pay, and tenure) have positive and signi…cant associations with the probability of investing in the o¤er, and the conditional amount invested. Knowledge about the o¤er, when measured with human resource department occupation, is not associated with the probability of investing in the o¤er, but it is signi…cantly associated with the conditional amount invested. However, the variable measuring the number of previous o¤ers to which employees were eligible in the past has a negative association with the probability of investing in ESPPs, and with the conditional amount invested (Heckman) . The variable describing asset choices through the percentage invested in previous ESPPs has a positive and signi…cant association with both the probability of investing in the o¤er and the conditional amount 4.5 Factors associated with the conditional probability of being an "active" investor Tables 6 and 7 report results from Heckprob regressions (columns (1) and (2)) and the probit regressions (column (3)). Two variables measuring the presence of potential liquidity constraints (income and tenure) have a signi…cant positive association with the conditional probability of being an "active" investor. However, we …nd evidence of a negative association between incentive pay and the conditional probability of being an "active" investor. In the Heckprob model, privileged knowledge about the o¤er, measured by the variable describing whether the employee works in the human resource department, is not signi…cantly associated with the conditional probability of being an "active"
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investor. However, this variable is signi…cant at the 10% level in the conditional probit model (-), and eligibility to former o¤ers has a negative association.
Employees who invested in former o¤ers (and do not face Access choice limitations) have higher probability of being "active" investors. In the conditional probit model, employees with lower transaction costs, e.g. with better …nancial expertise, have a lower probability of being "active" investors. Other factors associated with the conditional probability of being an "active" investor are:
age (+), gender (+), tenure (-), Masters' degree (+), and higher hierarchical category (+). Finally, our interaction terms (T enure Age; M ale P aris)
have positive and signi…cant associations with the probability of investing in ESPPs and the conditional probability of being an "active" investor.
Discussion
Originally, ESPPs were introduced in France to provide an opportunity to em- 
Main …ndings
We …nd a positive association between amounts invested and education level:
compared with other employees, employees holding an Masters' Degree have higher ESPPs investments. It can be argued that our education variable is based upon the degree observed and only captures general human capital information.
However, additional variables (hierarchical rank and tenure) that capture speci…c skills also have a positive association with ESPPs investments.
We …nd the presence of a novelty e¤ect: savers invest larger amounts if they have never had an access to ESPPs. However, this e¤ect is tempered by the fact that employees who already invested in previous ESPPs had higher amounts invested and higher probability of being "active" investors. Age has an important association with investment decisions. Oldest employees may adopt o¤ensive investment patterns because retirement is an early withdrawal motive. Results for the cross-variable between age and tenure shows that this e¤ect is blurred by age, that is, the e¤ect of time with the company diminishes with age. As employees reach retirement age, they are able to withdraw funds without penalty, 
What determines non-participation?
Our 
Limitations
Our paper has several limitations. We were not able to measure matching con- Our data were collected in a …nancial institution. It can be assumed that employees working in a¢ liates such as investment bank, funding bank, and private equity bank have a good …nancial knowledge. This feature may explain why in our sample human capital is positively correlated with investment in ESPPs.
Indeed, studying a bank implies that most employees have a good basic knowledge of …nance, so the interpretation of some variables is less straightforward.
Speci…cally, higher tenure could be associated with better …nancial expertise.
Moreover, we …nd that employees with …nancial expertise have a lower probability of being "active" investors. Such employees have doubtlessly access to information dealing with much more lucrative …nancial products o¤ered by their company such as stocks options. This result can be explained by the assumption of bounded rationality. Employees who have strongest …nancial knowledge may choose not to invest in ESPPs because they can …nd less constraining investment opportunities and a better diversi…cation of risks. Because of the speci…city of our sample, our results may not be generalized to other companies.
Conclusion
This paper provides an innovative study of ESPPs contributors' investment strategies, distinguishing "active" investors from other investors. This approach allows comparing two di¤erent investment behaviors that are associated with the willingness of investing in company stocks. We test Engelhardt and Madrian (2004) assumptions about the determinants of non-participation. Liquidity constraint is measured by gross income, incentive pay, and tenure. In order to assess the employees'knowledge of the plan, we identify which department of the company each employee belongs to and how many ESPPs they have been eligible to. Concerning the asset choice, we know how much employees contributed to ESPPs investments in the past. Finally, we make the assumption that transaction costs are lower for employees holding a job requiring …nancial expertise.
We …nd that the presence of liquidity constraint, imperfect knowledge of the plan, asset choice, and transaction costs are related to the investment decisions. Speci…cally, employees facing liquidity constraints are less likely to invest in ESPPs. Knowledge about the plan is positively associated with the willingness to invest: employees who work in the company' department in charge of organizing ESPPs have a greater probability of investing in the o¤er, and a greater probability of becoming an "active" investor. Employee owners have higher probability of being "active" investors, showing that asset choice is associated with investment decisions. Finally, lower transaction costs are associated with higher investment probabilities, higher conditional amounts invested, and higher conditional probability of being "active" investors.
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We …nd the presence of a novelty e¤ect, as the largest amounts invested were by employees who have not already been eligible to previous o¤ers. The existence of unobservable motives of investment can be explained by a lower risk aversion, a higher time preference, or a strong willingness to participate to corporate governance. We underline that some investors may only be motivated by a short-term interest, or the willingness to prepare themselves to future risks such as unemployment. 
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